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Palestinian
Economic
Israeli
Development:
Actions in Light of the 1994 Paris Protocol and
International Economic Law
Vincent El Hayek
In 1993, Israel and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization signed the Oslo Accords,' starting a peace process
that was meant to end with a Palestinian State. The Oslo
Accords were only the start of numerous agreements, including
the 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which became Annex IV to
the Accords, commonly known as the Paris Protocol. 2 The Paris
Protocol laid out the framework for what was to be the
economic relationship between Israel and a Palestinian state.
Its writers recognized the importance that stability and growth
in the Palestinian economy had for any hope of a lasting peace. 3
As such, they developed a strategy which hinged on four
"pillars" for Palestinian
economic
development:
11]
International aid; [2] close Israeli-Palestinian economic
relations; [3] foreign and private investment; and [4] access to
foreign markets for Palestinian exports.4
When the Paris Protocol was first signed, excitement was
high. The expectation was that this would be a boom to the
Palestinian economy. Billions of dollars were quickly pledged in
foreign aid,5 with the hope that private investment would soon
1. The Oslo Accords were actually a series of agreements signed by Israel

and the Arab Nations. See, e.g., Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993,, Isr-P.L.O., 32 I.L.M. 1525;

Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, With Selected
Annexes, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr-P.L.O., 36 I.L.M. 551, 567; see also JillAllison
Weiner, Israel, Palestine, and the Oslo Accords, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 230,

232 (1999).
2. Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel and
the PLO, P.L.O.-Isr., Apr. 29, 1994, P.L.O.-Isr., 7 PAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 308

[hereinafter Paris Protocol].

3. David P. Fidler, Foreign Private Investment in PalestineRevisited: An
Analysis of the Revised PalestinianInvestment Law, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 293, 295 (1999) [hereinafter PalestinianInvestment Law].

4. Id. at 297.

5. MEL LEVINE, Palestinian

Economic

Progress

Under the Oslo
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follow. Inside Palestine, the prospect of being able to export to a
global market raised hopes that the Palestinian industrial
sector would finally be able to grow.' However, the reality was
just the opposite. In the first two years after the signing, the
Palestinian economy was crushed,7 and has limped along ever
since.The reasons for the continued struggles faced by the
Palestinian economy are numerous. Some are unintended
consequences of the Protocol agreements, others are problems
with the Palestinian Authority, but many emanate from Israeli
actions .8
This paper is broken up into four parts. The first part looks
at international law generally and which economic rights
should be upheld. The second part analyzes the Paris Protocol
in particular, laying out what was agreed upon and what was
meant to happen. The third part examines Israeli actions since
the signing, looking both at breaches of the Protocol (both by its
terms and by the spirit of the agreements) and actions in
accordance with it that have still hurt Palestinian
development. This part breaks down how Israeli actions have
violated both the Protocol and international law. Finally, the
fourth part quickly looks at alternatives to the current system.
I. ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The economic rights of individuals is a rapidly evolving
area of international law. There remains much confusion as to
what "economic" rights are protected by international law. The
seminal piece of international law regarding economic rights is
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Agreements 395, 400, in Palestine and InternationalLaw: Essays on Politics
and Economics (Sandford R. Silverburg ed. 2002).
6. Id.
7. See Oren Gross, Mending Walls: The Economic Aspects of IsraeliPalestinian Peace, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1539, 1560 (2000)

(pointing out that between 1994 and 1996, it is estimated that the Palestinian

standard of living decreased by 25% and "imports falling from [46%] to [38%]

of the GDP" between 1992 and 1995).
8. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], PalestinianEconomy
in East JerusalemLeft in "Development Limbo" Under Israeli Occupation, says
UNCTAD
Report
(May
8,
2013),
available
at
http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionlD=491
("It has
been estimated that the Israeli separation barrier has imposed over $1 billion
in direct losses to the economy of East Jerusalem since its construction began
in 2003.").
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Rights, 9 adopted by the UN in 1966, but are several other major
treaties that reference people's economic rights, including the
2009 Lisbon Treaty and the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights. 10 Finally, there is case law in the United States which
attempts to define economic deprivation for individuals
internationally."
The ICESCR, which Israel signed and ratified, generally
recognizes the right of people to an "adequate" standard of
living, one that is supposed to be constantly improving. 2 It lays
out this major goal in several specific articles. Articles 6
through 8 discuss the labor rights people possess. 3 These
articles start by recognizing the existence of a "right to work."
Upholding a "right to work" means granting everyone the
ability to choose the primary job by which they make their
living. The "right to work" also imposes a duty to guarantee
equal access to employment opportunities and to prevent
discrimination. 4 The Covenant requires signatories to work
towards "full employment", which the OECD explains "take[s]
into account both the rate of unemployement and the rate of
employment." 1 Article 7 says 6that the work guaranteed in
Article 6 must be "decent" work.
The right to work is defined as both a personal and a
9. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
10. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C

306)1; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 12, 2007,

2007 (C 303) 1.
rd

11.*t See, e.g., Bao Hui Chen v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 438 Fed. Appx. 125

(3 Cir. 2011); Salman v. Gonzales, 238 Fed. Appx. 306
d
Holder, 398 Fed. Appx. 638 (2 Cir. 2010).

(91h

Cir. 2007); Jiang v.

12. ICESCR, supra note 12, at art. 11.
13. Id. at art. 6- 8.
14. See id.at art. 7(c) ("Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of
equal value without distinction of any kind ").
15. OECD, POLICIES TOWARDS FULL EMPLOYMENT 24 (2000).
16. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General
Comment 18, Article 6, The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment
of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, sec. 11(7), (Thirty-fifth session,

2006), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (2006) [hereinafter Comment 18] ("Work as
specified in article 6 of the Covenant must be decent work. This is work that
respects the fundamental rights of the human person as well as the rights of
workers in terms of conditions of work safety and remuneration. It also
provides an income allowing workers to support themselves and their families
as highlighted in article 7 of the Covenant. These fundamental rights also
include respect for the physical and mental integrity of the worker in the
exercise of his/her employment." ) (emphasis in original).
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7
collective right, but it does not guarantee everyone a job.
"[Sieveral universal and regional human rights instruments
have recognized the right to work ....and affirmed the
principle that" this "right to work" imposes specific legal
obligations on states. 8 States must ensure equal access to work
and to equal pay for all persons in addition to having an
obligation to push for full employment, including establishing
training/educational programs as well as directly employing
people.' 9
Article 11 goes on to establish the "right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living. 2 0 An "adequate" standard of living
is defined as a right to adequate clothing, housing, food, and a
right to "continu[al] improvement in living conditions." 2' The
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (the
"CESCR") defined adequate housing as having "'adequate
privacy, adequate space, adequate security, adequate lighting
and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and adequate
location with regard to work and basic facilities - all at a
reasonable cost'. 22 The CESCR said adequate housing includes
guaranteed legal "tenure," which translates into protection
from potential eviction. 23 Adequate housing also requires that
the housing be accessible, and located in such a way as to allow
people access to employment, healthcare and adequate
infrastructure.24 Adequate housing is not just providing a place
for people to stay, "[r]ather it should be seen as the right to live
somewhere in security, peace and dignity."25
"Adequate food" means more than a "minimum" level of
calories per person-it means "the availability of food in a
quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of
individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable
within a given culture."26 Most importantly, the CESCR has

17.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See generally id.

Id.at 1(3).
Id. at 1(2).
ICESCR, supra note 12, at art. 11(1).
Id.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General

Comment 4, The Right to Adequate Housing, art. 7, (Sixth session, 1991), U.N.

Doc. E/1992/23, annex III at 114 (1991) [hereinafter Comment 4].
23. Id. at art. 8(a).
24. Id. at art. 8(f).
25. Id. at art. 7.
26. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General
Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, art. 8, (Twentieth session, 1999), U.N.
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held that the right to adequate food is connected to two things:
the right to water and access to land.27 People must have
reasonable access to food-producing land because they have the
right to feed themselves.28 Finally, states have an "obligation to
respect existing access to adequate food," requiring states to
"not... take any measures that result in preventing such
29
access."
The Covenant has many other articles, which collectively
lay the framework for people's basic economic and social rights.
While the ICESCR does a fairly comprehensive job of creating
an outline for people's economic rights, the Covenant "does not
refer to the the economic freedoms of profession, trade and
private property."°Although the ICESCR does not mention
these things, they are mentioned in several other international
treaties including "the 2009 Lisbon Treaty and in its EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights."3' Finally, as seen by several
immigration and asylum decisions, the US judicial system is
starting to recognize economic rights as being fundamental,
albeit in a haphazard way. 32
While the recognition of individual economic rights is a
relatively new thing, a framework does exist. Though the
contours of these rights have yet to be solidly defined, core
principles have been established. Individuals have the right to
an adequate quality of life, to be able to pursue work in a field
they choose, and to be able to improve that quality of life for
themselves and their families.

Doe. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999) [hereinafter CESCR 12].

27. See
World
Health
Organization,
Food
Security,
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en/.
28. CESCR 12, supra note 29, at art. 12.
29. Id. at art. 15.
30. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Economic Law in the 21st
Century: Need for Stronger "Democratic Ownership" and Cosmopolitan
Reforms, 31 POLISH Y.B.INT'L L. 9, 18 (2011)
31. Id.
32. Fatma E. Marouf & Deborah Anker, Socioeconomic Rights and
Refugee Status: Deepening the Dialogue Between Human Rights and Refugee
Law, International Refugee Law, and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from
Deprivation, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 793 (2009) ("However, the BIA had also

stated in In re Acosta that persecution 'could consist of economic deprivation
or restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to an individual's life or

freedom.'); Senior State Department Official Describes Shift in U.S. Policy

Regarding Economic, Social, and CulturalRights, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 590
(2011). ("Human dignity has a political component and an economic
component--and these are inexorably linked ...").
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II. THE PARIS PROTOCOL AGREEMENTS
The Paris Protocol agreements touched on multiple areas,
with the most important ones being "customs, taxes, labor...
land] industry." 33 The Protocol was meant to establish a sort of
hybrid free trade agreement/customs union/common market,
"promot[ing] private sector development. 4
The customs union was to be mostly based on the State of
Israel's duties and rates with a few exceptions. 5 This allowed
Palestinians to set their own tariff rates so long as they were
not lower than Israeli rates. 6 The two exceptions allowed for
"specified goods produced" in Arab countries, up to a certain
quota, and for "specified goods described as" aid related items
without a quota, such as food, to be imported at Palestinian
determined tariff rates.3 7 The purpose of keeping tariff rates
equal was meant to prevent importers from using the lower
rates of Israel or Palestine to bring in cheaper goods destined
for the other.38 Import taxes are collected when they first enter
Israel, and a mechanism was established where Israel would
credit the Palestinian Authority for all revenue collected on
goods destined for Palestine. 39 The agreement gave the
Palestinian Authority the power to negotiate trade agreements
with states and international organizations in an effort to open
markets for Palestinian exports.4 °
The customs union also provides for a sort of monetary
union. 4' The New Israel Shekel became the "circulating
33. See Gaza Gateway, Will we always have Paris?, 2 (September 13,

20012), http://gisha.org/en-blog/2012/09/13/will-we-always-have-paris/.
34. PalestinianInvestment Law, supra note 3, at 295.

35. David P. Fidler, Peace Through Trade? Developments in Palestinian
155, 162 (1998).

Trade Law During the Peace Process, 38 VA. J. INT'L L.
36. Id.
37. Id.

38. See Keith C. Molkner, Legal and Structural Hurdles to Achieving
PoliticalStability and Economic Development in the PalestinianTerritories,19
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1419, 1448-49 (1996) (explaining the procedure for

collecting import tax on good that arrive via one territory but are destined for
the other).
39. Id.
40. See Christian Hauswaldt, Problems Under the Ec-Israel Association

Agreement: The Export of Goods Produced in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip Under the Ec-IsraelAssociation Agreement, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 591, 597-

98 (2003) (outlining the "Agreement between the EC and the Palestinian
National Authority).
41. See id. at 598 (describing the economic aspect of the agreement).
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currency" in Palestine,4 2 and though the Jordanian Dinar and
USD were still utilized, banks were only to accept the shekel or
dinar. 43 Despite the creation of a Palestinian Monetary
Authority,44 the Bank of Israel controls Palestinian monetary
policy through the shekel.45
The agreement sets out a tax structure, discussing direct
taxes and value-added taxes ("VAT").46 It allows for Israel and
Palestine to each have the power to collect taxes in areas they
control.47 The Palestinians also have the power to set direct
taxes in areas they control, such as income and property,
independently of Israel,48 but the rates must not be more than
one to two percent lower than the Israeli rates with a minimum
floor of fifteen percent. 49 Finally, each state is to receive the
revenue from VAT paid by their citizens in the opposite states.
For example, VAT collected on Palestinian purchases in Israel
50
is to be remitted and vice versa.
While the agreement, as part of the customs union, in
creating the free trade common market area, provides for the
42. Amir H. Khoury, An American Bank in the PalestinianAuthority:
Investing in the Peace, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 739, 744 (1999).
43. Id. at 750-51 (explaining that withdraws from banks in the area may
only be received in Dinar or the shekel).
44. See id. at 747 (outlining the creation of the Palestinian Monetary
Authority as authorized in the Economic Protocol).
45. See Simone Daud, Mondoweiss, Money for nothing and occupation for
free: The 1994 Paris Protocols on economic relations between Israel and the
PLO, (September 28, 2011), http://mondoweiss.net/2011/09/money-for-nothingand-occupation-for-free-the- 1994-paris-protocols-on-economic-relationsbetween-israel-and-the-plo.html ("In the agreement the Palestinians cannot
issue currency and, in fact, have no say whatsoever in monetary policy.").
46. KEITH C. MOLKNER, Legal and Structural Hurdles to Achieving
Political Stability and Economic Development in the Palestinian Territories
367, 384 in Palestineand InternationalLaw: Essays on Politics and Economics
(Sandord R. Silverburg ed. 2002).
47. See id. at 385 ("Over 200 Palestinian tax officers were hired.").
48. Id. at 384.
49. Id. at 387.
50. Id. (explaining the system for the distribution of such revenues as
follows: It is the responsibility of the VAT departments of each side is to
distribute special invoices to businesses transacting with the other side. These
business must then issue these invoices whenever they sell goods or services
to the other side, so that the taxes can be separated out from the general VAT
collections. For example, an Israeli company that sells to Palestinian
customers must be given special invoices provided by the Israeli VAT
department, and must use these invoices to record each transaction with a
Palestinian. The company must then return these invoices to the Israeli VAT
department along with the taxes due. The Israeli VAT department must then
clear these revenues to the PA within 6 days.)
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free movement of goods between Israel and Palestine,' it does
not provide for the free movement of labor. 2 It merely provides
that "[bioth sides will attempt to maintain the normality of
movement of labor between them, subject to each side's right to
determine from time to time the extent and conditions of the
labor movement into its area.
The agreement also touches on several other aspects, such
as tourism, agriculture and insurance. However, the biggest
effects have come from the preceding measures. 54
III. ISRAELI ACTIONS SINCE 1994; STALLING
ECONOMIC PROGRESS
The Israeli economy dwarfs that of all of its neighbors,
especially Palestine.
Both before and after the 1994
agreements, the Palestinian economy was completely
dependent upon Israel. 5 6 While Palestinians are less dependent

upon Israel as a source of work, Israel dominates Palestinian
trade which, due to the undeveloped nature of the economy,
makes up eighty-five percent of Palestine's

GDP.57 Israel

accounts for seventy-one percent of Palestinian imports, and is
the destination for ninety-seven percent of Palestinian exports,
amounting to seventy-four percent of Palestine's total trade
value. 8 Comparatively, Palestine's second biggest trade
partner, Jordan, only accounted for just over two percent of
Palestinian

trade.59

Even those goods destined for outside

51. Paris Protocol, supra note 2, art. IX.
52. Id. at art. VII.

53. Id. at art. VII.

54. See generally MOLKNER, supra note 46.
55. See Gross, supra note 7, at 1551-52 (stating that Israel's GDP in 1998
was $100.5 billion, making it greater than the combination of Egypt, $82.7
billion, Jordan, $7.4 billion, and the Occupied Territories, $3.6 billion).
56. Id. at 1556 (explaining that 1992 wages paid to Palestinians working
in Israel made up 25% of Palestinian GDP, by 1996 Palestinians working in
Israel contribution to GDP dropped to 6%).
57. WorldBank, An Analysis of the Economic Restrictions Confronting the
West
Bank
and
Gaza,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/Economi
crestrictionstSept.08.pdf [hereinafter Economic Restrictions].
58. Israeli Movement Restrictions and Impediments, Palestinian
Federation
of
Industries
(September
2006),
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas 9916-1522-1-30.pdf?070117115314 [hereinafter
Movement Restrictions].
59. Id. (Europe as a whole only accounted for 15% of Palestinian Imports.
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markets mostly move through Israeli seaports and airports.0
This dependence is entirely one-sided. In 1992, one-third of
Palestinian workers were employed in Israel. By 1996, Israeli
employers were able to replace them with enough workers from
East Africa and elsewhere that this number decreased to seven
percent. 1 Further, trade with Palestinians is a "negligible" part
of Israel's annual trade balance. 2
Given the nature of the economic situation, Israel could
"decouple" from the Palestinian economy without much pain.6 3
This section will look at harmful Israeli actions, starting with
impediments to travel (both for labor and goods). It will then
move to tax issues and issues related to the monetary union,
issues with land use, and finally barriers to foreign investment
and dealing.
A. IMPEDIMENTS TO TRAVEL:

As mentioned, the Protocol was meant to establish a
common market, where goods would freely flow; while the flow
of labor was not guaranteed, it was encouraged in the spirit of
the arrangement. However, pointing to its need for security,
Israel prevented a "common market" from existing through a
system of permits and border closures. 4 Starting in 1993,
Israel repeatedly sealed its border with the Occupied
Territories to all traffic, in blatant violation of the Protocol
agreement's guarantee of a free flow of goods. Past the border,
there currently exist 520 checkpoints or other fixed
However, it is estimated that up to 54% of "imports" from Israel are in fact "reimports" from overseas with Palestinians using Israeli intermediaries.).
60. Id. (80% of non-Israeli Palestinian imports come through Israel ports).
61. See Gross, supra note 7, at 1552-61.

62. Id. at 1552(Trade with Palestine made up less than 1% of Israeli
imports, and while Palestinian consumption of Israeli goods and services is
more prominent, it is still a relatively minor market.).
63. Molkner, supra note 43, at 1422 n.6 (referencing a policy called
Hafrada, or Separation, established in response to several terrorist attacks);
Gross, supra note 7, at 1571 (The size and development differences between

the Israeli and Palestinian economies "minimize the implications for the

Israeli economy of economic separation.").
64. See Movement Restrictions, supra note 58.
65. Arie Arnon, The Implication of Economic Borders Between Israel and
Palestine, 9 PALESTINE-ISR. J. OF POLITICS, ECON. & CULTURE 1, 3 (2002),

available at http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=122. Each day of closure costs

the Palestinian economy millions, total cost of border closures is in the
billions. Id.
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impediments in the West Bank.
These, along with the
construction of the "Separation Wall", have effectively cut what
remains of the West Bank into three zones. The World Bank
estimates that these internal barriers alone caused a fifteen
percent decline in real Palestinian GDP between 2000 and
2002, while the Separation Wall costs the economy a further
69
twenty-three percent of GDP per year.
Beyond the border closures and physical barriers, Israel
has instituted an extensive "permit" system that controls the
flow of people and goods, both between Palestine and Israel,
and within areas of Palestine itself.70 The permit regulations
control all travel to and from Israel and the West Bank/Gaza,
and within the West Bank between Israeli-controlled areas and
Palestinian-controlled areas7' for both people and goods. This is
combined with extensive security checks and delays at border
crossings. A World Bank study found that, although crossings
were operating well below capacity, the average time to process
a Palestinian shipment through a border crossing was an hour
and forty-five minutes, even without any lines.72 Shipments of
Palestinian goods had to pass a full scanner inspection, with a
further sixty percent being manually inspected at random. 73
Once goods clear the border, they are further delayed in
clearing customs. In 2007, the average time for a shipment
from the West Bank to clear customs at Ashdod was ten days,
with delays of up to thirty, while the
74 average time for Israeli
shipments was only one to two days.

66. IKV Pax Christi, Analysing Israel's Economic Policy Towards
Palestine and the Practical Implications of Netanyahu's Economic Peace 1, 20
n.68 (2012), available at http://www.paxvoorvrede.nl/media/files/analysingisraels-economic-policy-towards-palestine-2012.pdf.

67. Movement Restrictions, supra note 58 (identifying the North, Central
and South zones).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70.

Israel's

Eyai Hareuveni, Arrested Development: The Long Term Impact of

Separation

Barrier

in

the

West

Bank

(Oct.

2012),

https://www.btselem.org/download/201210 arrested-development eng.pdf.

71. Id.
72. Economic Restrictions, supra note 57.
73. Id. (No "known trade" or sophisticated risk management system has
been put in place. Currently, no coordination with Palestinian Authorities
takes place, even though the General Administration for Crossings and
Borders (GACB), a Palestinian borders agency, exists.).
74. Id. (For Gazan firms the average was thirty days with delays lasting
up to sixty days.).
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If a common market truly existed, the differences in size
between the Israeli and Palestinian economy should provide
the perfect incentives for labor-intensive Palestinian industry
and agriculture. 5 However, through all of these measures,
Israel has effectively curtailed the development of a common
market. These barriers to movement have caused shipping
costs to increase by sixty-seven times on some routes.76 The
restrictions and delays on the shipments of goods vastly
increase the costs of doing business in Palestine, especially
when attempting to do cross-border business. The delays and
border closings make it impossible for businesspeople to
effectively plan a schedule, or to honor commitments. Further,
the internal barriers, and the complete lack of a transportation
link between the West Bank and Gaza, have barred the
Palestinian economy from achieving any economies of scale.77
This makes it nearly impossible for Palestinian businesses to
expand, as they effectively cannot reach foreign markets.
Exemplifying this is the fact that a full ninety-five percent of
Palestinian businesses have less than ten employees. 8 For
Palestinian business to expand, the country needs to be able to
sell to more than just its local communities. However, let the de
facto separation of the West Bank into three zones hinders
this. 9
The damage to economic growth from the hampering of
trade has increased unemployment, but so has the limiting of
labor. The permitting regime and security checkpoints hurt the
ability of Palestinians to work in Israel. Immediately after the
signing of the 1994 agreements, only 30,000 Palestinians were
granted work visas, down from 80,000 the year before. 80 To
make up for this loss of cheap labor, Israel has drastically
increased work permits given to individuals from other
countries. Work permits for foreigners jumped from 4,000 to

75.
76.
77.
78.
the

See Gross, supra note 7, at 1581.
See Movement Restrictions, supra note 58.
Economic Restrictions, supra note 57.
Id.; Cf. StatisticsAbout Business Size (includingSmall Business) from
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
available at

https://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html (approximately 78% of American
employer business have less than 10 employees).
79. Economic Restrictions, supra note 57 (reporting that in 2000, 60% of
West Bank businesses sold outside of their hometown, but by 2006 less than
40% did).
80. LEVINE, supra note 5 (noting that tens of thousands of workers who
informally were allowed entrance as day laborers are now barred).
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107,000 between 1992 and 1996 alone, giving Israel an
alternative to their need for Palestinian labor.8'
Israelis can make the argument that, if Palestine and
Israel are two different states, then they are not violating the
CESCR by closing the border and impeding Palestinian's
ability to work in Israel. The CESCR says nothing about letting
"foreigners" work within your state. In fact, had such a
provision existed, it is unlikely that most countries would have
signed on to the Covenant. However, regardless of whether
Palestine and Israel are considered one state or two, the
numerous barriers and checkpoints that crisscross the West
Bank are a prima facia violation of the Covenant. One of the
core obligations imposed upon states by the right to work is
that states must "ensure the right of access to employment,
especially for disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and
groups".82 Further, states must "avoid any measure that results
in discrimination and unequal treatment in the private and
public sectors of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals
and groups,"83 something Israeli policies, such as those favoring
military veterans for employment, clearly do.
B. TAX ISSUES:
Israeli harms the Palestinian economy through tax policies
in two ways. First, its control over the VAT and tariff rates has
had adverse effects. Second, Israel has frequently used its
control over large parts of the collection of these taxes as a
weapon.
Given the disparity in development between Israel and
Palestine, both the tariff and VAT rates set for the Israeli
economy are much higher than what would be optimal for the
Palestinian economy. 84 These higher rates directly increase the
cost of living for Palestinians, whose average income is not at a
level that normally would support a tax rate as high as the

81. See Movement Restrictions, supra note 58. The number of foreign

workers went from 10,000 in 2004 to 200,000 in 2006 when those without
proper work visas are factored in. These workers allowed labor-intensive
Israeli industries, agriculture and construction, to continue without using
Palestinian labor. Gross, supra note 7, at 1560.
82. Comment 18, supra note 19 (emphasis added).

83. Id.

84. MOLKNER, supra note 46 at 386.
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85

fifteen percent VAT minimum. They also skew the economy,
as the higher tariff rates make it harder to import goods from
countries other than Israel, deepening Palestinian dependence.
The PLO accepted high VAT and tariff rates in exchange
for free access to the Israeli economy.86 While the high tax rates
set by the Israelis are not a breach of the Protocol, they do
increase the cost of doing business with the outside world. This
cost was supposed to be offset by the increase in trade with
Israel, but the restrictions on movement listed above have, in
reality, burdened Palestinians with "the price of a customs
union without enjoying its benefits".
Israel has clearly violated the Protocol's tax arrangements
by manipulating the clearance procedure for tax collections.
Tariff revenues make up a significant portion of the Palestinian
Authority's budget,88 but the Palestinian Authority is
dependent upon Israel clearing those revenues in accordance
with the Protocol.8 9 Repeatedly, Israel has withheld revenue,
holding the Palestinian Authority hostage to Israel's
demands. 90 This is an oft used weapon, and is in violation of the
Protocol that requires revenues to be cleared within six days.
This is worsened by the underreporting of taxes due to the
Palestinian Authority. Given the restrictions placed on
Palestinian businesses' ability to move goods, many Palestinian
businesses buy goods from overseas that Israeli intermediary
companies import, as to avoid the extensive Israeli customs and
security checks. 91 While this makes it easier for Palestinian
businesses to import from abroad, it causes the Palestinian
Authority to lose a large amount of revenue.92 With VAT
clearance, many Israeli companies selling to Palestinians are
never provided the invoices required to show that the taxes
paid are due to the Palestinian Authority. 93 While these
,,87

85. Id. at 387.
86. Id. at 387.
87. Id. at 387.
88. IKV Pax Christi, supra note 66.
89. Paris Protocol, supra note 2, at art. III, 15.
90. Analyzing Israel's Economic Policy Towards Palestine and the
Practical Implications of Netanyahu's Economic Peach, Young Professional
Research Initiative (2012) http://www.paxvoorvrede.nl/media/files/analysingisraels-economic-policv-towards-palestine-2012.ndf.

91. See id. at 20.
92. Id. at 23 (estimating 58% of Palestinian imports from Israel come
from another country).
93. MOLKNER, supra note 46, at 387.
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collection problems are widely recognized, the Palestinian
Authority does not have the resources to monitor the movement
of goods94 and Israel has no incentive to fix the issue.
Finally, the lack of control of the tariff rates inhibits
Palestine's ability to independently sign trade agreements.
Since Palestine relies on Israeli tariff rates, they can provide
few incentives to countries in potential trade deals. This makes
them almost dependent upon the goodwill of foreign countries
in negotiating free trade agreements.
C. MONETARY UNION AND FIscAL POLICY:
The Protocol provides for the establishment of a
Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) to regulate Palestine's
financial sector.95 Realistically, this organization is toothless
because it is limited to regulating financial institutions. With
the Shekel as the primary currency, the Bank of Israel asserts
full control over fiscal policy in Palestine. While the PMA
unilaterally authorizes new bank branches in Palestinian
territory, 96 any banks making transactions in the Shekel must
have a "correspondent" Israeli bank and must send daily
reports to the
Bank of Israel, amongst a host of other
. .. Central
97
responsibilities. Banks in Palestine are "to deal exclusively" in
the Shekel or Dinar, 98 making use of other foreign currencies
challenging. Consequently, these restrictions demonstrate how
the Bank of Israel is the de facto controller of the financial
sector in Palestine.
Given the constraint of labor flows to Israel, the lack of
control over fiscal policy further hamstrings Palestine's ability
to encourage economic development. As evidenced by the
European Union, a fiscal union between a stronger and weaker
economy requires a free flow of labor for the weaker economy to
benefit. Without the ability to set interest rates or issue
currency, Palestine is unable to increase the money supply or

94. Id. at 388.
95. E.g., Khoury, supra note 42, at 746.
96. Accord id. at 750-51. However, any banks who have head offices
headquartered with the PMA "may not open a branch in Israel" or in West
Bank areas that are outside of the PA's control. Id. at 750. This prohibition
limits the development of a native Palestinian financial sector. Id.
97. See id. at 749-50 (involving foreign currencies and many import and

export services).
98. Id. at 750.
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encourage exports by decreasing the value of their currency.
The Palestinian economy needs the remittances of hard
currency that workers could provide otherwise, every time the
Bank of Israel raises interest rates, the Palestinian economy
will suffer.
D. LAND USE CONTROLS:
The Protocol specifically avoided border issues, never
distinguishing between what made up "Palestine" and what
made up "Israel." Instead, the Protocol applies to all areas
under full control of the Palestinian Authority and the Gaza
Strip. At the time of the signing, this was only Jericho but has
since expanded as the Israeli military withdrew from much of
the West Bank.99 In the 1995 Oslo Accords, the West Bank split
up into three distinct zones: Area A covers urban centers, Area
B covers rural centers, and Area C is the remaining space in
between. The Palestinian Authority is authorized full control
over the smallest area, zone A, 100 and the rest of the land is
controlled by Israel and the Israeli military.
While the Protocol does not specifically establish
mechanisms for the use of land, the purpose behind the
agreement was to create economic growth in the Occupied
Territories; however, Israeli land policy has created the
opposite effect.
Area C makes up the biggest portion of the West Bank, and
completely envelops every Area A or B enclave.' 0' As of 2008,
thirty-eight percent of Area C was entirely off limits to
Palestinians, 2 and Palestinians had to receive permits to use
the rest of the land. 0 3 Building permits are rejected by Israeli
authorities for numerous reasons, including a lack of land
registration, which is the case for seventy percent of the West
Bank. 10 4 In fact, ninety-four percent of construction permits
99. E.g.,

The Paris Protocol

ADENAUER-STIFTUNG

-

-

Historical Classification, KONRAD-

PALESTINIAN

TERRITORIES,

Oct.

14,

2014,

http://www.kas.de/palaestinensische-gebiete/en/pages/11895/.
100. See Economic Restrictions, supra note 57, at 9.
101. Accord id. at 9-10 (accounting for 59% of land, but only 10% of
Palestinian population).
102. See id. (explaining that 23% of land is restricted because of military
use, 10.2% is enveloped by the Separation Wall, 5.1% is occupied by

settlements).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 11. Private ownership or title of land indicates that land is
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were denied between 2000 and 2007 due to a lack of land
registration. 10 5 As a result, the Palestinian population
is
06
restricted in small enclaves that cannot grow and develop.
Additionally, the division has created artificial land
shortages in Palestinian cities and towns that are barred from
naturally sprawling out, driving up housing prices. °' Because
all Palestinian population centers are surrounded by Area C
land, any transportation infrastructure projects must be
approved by the Israeli military, 0 8 limiting the development of
infrastructure and industry in the Palestinian area. The same
situation occurs with industrial parks envisioned by the
Protocol negotiations. By their nature, industrial parks require
large amounts of land, which is only available in Area C, and of
course permitting approval has been slow.'09
While the right to land is not explicitly guaranteed by the
Covenant, Israeli land policies violate the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in several ways. First, it
is a violation of the Palestinian people's right to adequate

water, an aspect of the right to adequate food."0 Israel has
arbitrarily taken control over a majority of the water supplies
in the West Bank, leaving disproportionately small amounts for
Palestinian use.
More noticeably, Israeli land policy directly affects the
right to adequate housing, since access to land is a condition
necessary to provide adequate housing."' The Committee on
registered, but the Israeli military had stopped registration in 1967. All nonregistered land is considered "State Land". Id.
105. Cf. id. (showing how 97% of building applications had been allowed in

1972).
106. Id. at 12.
107. Id. at 12 n.96 ("The past few years have witnessed an explosion of
land prices, particularly in areas of high population density In Ramallah, for
instance, the municipality reports that prices of commercial land in the city
have doubled each year for the past three years, reaching $4000/sq m Even
more striking is the clear differential between prices of otherwise similar land
in Area A vs Area C, where the premium for land classified as A or B vs C can
range from 0% to over 150% or more, depending on the location and the
perceived relative -safety of the property of Area C from confiscation or
demolition.").
108. See id. at 12.
109. Id. Four industrial parks have been planned in Palestine, but the
biggest obstacle to moving forward is the availability of land. Id. n.95.
110. See Comment 4, supra note 25, at annex III para. 8.
111. Accord Elisabeth Wickeri, "Land Is Life, Land Is Power":
Landlessness, Exclusion, and Deprivation in Nepal, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
930, 1015 (2011).
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has expressly stated that
forced evictions are a prima facie violation of article 11 of the
CESCR, 112 whereby many Palestinians have experienced such
evictions. Further, Israeli control of the majority of land in the
West Bank represses Palestinian communities' ability to
expand, which creates an artificial shortage of land for
individuals to live on, directly affecting housing affordability in
an artificial manner, another tenant of adequate housing. 3
Israel's dominance over land, exacerbated by Israelicontrolled land surrounding and isolating each Palestinian
community, combined with barriers to travel, puts into
question the accessibility of housing available to Palestinians.
The CESCR requires adequate housing to be accessible, with
basic infrastructure, and to be located in such a manner that it
is accessible to work." 4 Israeli policies have created an
environment that directly damages the accessibility of
Palestinian housing"15-again, in violation of the CESCR. To be
clear, adequate housing is not just "having a roof over one's
head.""6
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PARIS PROTOCOL
Any alternatives to the current system must take into
account the hard realities occurring on the ground.
Theoretically, a customs union and common market between
Palestine and Israel should have been mutually beneficial, but
in actuality, given Israeli actions and issues with the
Palestinian Authority (corruption, weak economic legal
structure, and poor administrative ability)," 7 it has been
disastrous to the Palestinian economy.

112. See generally CESCR, General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate
housing (Art. 11.1): Forced evictions, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, annex IV (May 20,

1997) (explaining the harms of forced evictions).
113. West Bank and Gaza Area C and the Future of the Palestinian

Economy,

Report

No.

AUS2922,

UNISPAL

(Oct.

2,

2013),

http://webcache.googleusercontent.consearch?q=cache:aEAYzkXqJ54J:unispa
l.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/E5B9C3E9592A5E7285257BFE004A5369+&cd=8&

hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari. Over the past two decades, housing
prices have increased 24% more than expected because of the restrictions on
Palestinian usage of Area C land. Id.
114. Comment 4, supra note 25, at para. 7.
115. IKV Pax Christi, supra note 66, at 23.
116. Comment 4, supra note 25, at para. 7.
117. See generally MOLKNER, supra note 46.
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A "traditional" economic agreement would not work. For
example, there have been proposals of developing a traditional
free trade agreement, but Israel has flatly rejected the idea,
originally for fear of implicitly recognizing Palestinian
borders. 118 In fact, a traditional customs union would not work
much differently than the current framework. Therefore, the
situation calls for a unique solution which should include
aspects of various economic arrangements. Below are several
proposals that, together, should improve the situation, while
reducing the Palestinian Authority's dependence on Israel.
A. INDEPENDENT CURRENCY

First, the Palestinian Authority should be granted
complete fiscal independence and should be permitted to
establish its own currency. This would give the Palestinian
Authority the ability to influence the economy through fiscal
means, and the abilities to change interest rates and increase
or decrease the money supply are extremely powerful economic
tools (consider the massive fiscal stimulus conducted by the
American Federal Reserve, the recent "quantitative easing,"
and the changing of interest rates). Additionally, the
Palestinian Authority would be able to raise money in an
emergency through printing and encourage exports or
investment by weakening the currency or decreasing interest
rates.
Due to the current trade deficit and inability to print its
own money, Palestine must "sell" whatever foreign exchange
reserves it has to Israel to convert into NIS in order to finance
their imports." 9 The Palestinian Authority's incapacity to raise
foreign currency, mainly due to low investment levels, furthers
this problem. Effectively, any foreign currency that enters
Palestine, whether aid or investment, is likely to end up in
Israel.
Having control of fiscal policy would liberate the
Palestinian banking sector from Israel. Moreover, the
Palestinian Authority would allow banks to accept transactions
in foreign currencies, especially dollars and euros, a major
incentive to outside investors.

118.
119.

See Gross, supra note 7, at 1598 -99.
Id.
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B. POWER OVER TARIFF RATES
The Palestinian Authority needs the power to set
independent tariff rates. Currently, Palestinian customs duties
and tariff rates are pegged at Israeli levels. This takes away
the the Palestinian Authority's ability to effectively craft a
targeted trade policy. The Palestinian Authority cannot pick
and choose which industries to protect with higher tariffs, nor
can it effectively negotiate trade agreements with foreign
countries. With rates and duties set at the Israeli level, the
Palestinian Authority has no incentives to offer other countries
during free trade agreements and negotiations. Instead, the
Palestinian Authority must depend on Israeli free trade
agreements. Unfortunately, Israel conducts little business with
Arab countries in which Palestine would likely experience good
trading relationships. 20
There are two problems with retaining the power over
tariff rates. First, there is an issue with policing the end
destination of goods coming through Israel, and second,
collecting the revenue will be difficult. Allegedly, the original
reason for the customs union resulted from Israeli concerns
about importers using lower Palestinian tariff rates to enter
Israel for free by way of the common market. However, while it
would arguably be difficult to prevent such leakage, regulation
could succeed if both sides agreed to do so.
A provision would have to exist whereby anyone who
imported end goods to Palestine but then re-exported them to
Israel would pay the difference in tariff rates to Israel. An
emphasis on "end" goods is only so as not to hamper the ability
of Palestinian industries to one day develop. Palestinian
manufacturers would likely be importing the raw materials for
what they produce, thus technically, any manufactured goods
they produced and exported to Israel would be a "re-export".
This type of "re-export" was not part of Israel's original concern
about companies skirting higher Israeli taxes by using
Palestinian intermediaries.
The collection of revenues would be more challenging to
regulate. Most trade flows through Israeli waters and airports,
which is unlikely to change. Therefore, some mechanism would
have to be in place where Palestinian officials or more likely
third party officials (given the unlikeliness of Israeli
120. E.g., Gross, supra note 7, at 1557.
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cooperation with Palestinian officials) are present at Israeli
ports of entry to collect dues on goods destined for Palestine.
Any other method would include the risk of Israel unilaterally
withholding revenues, something consistently done in the past.
C. ALTERNATE TRADE ROUTES
While the concept of free movement of labor and goods
between Israel and Palestine works well in theory, it is
impractical. Israeli security fears and measures are not going
to change in the near future, so the checkpoints, security
checks and permits that impede Palestinian trade will
continue. While the best alternative is to create Palestinian
controlled ports of entry (a seaport in Gaza, and an airport in
the West Bank), these are unrealistic alternatives. Thus, the
Palestinian Authority needs to reorient more trade through
Jordan.
While this is not a perfect alternative, it will save
Palestinian shippers money. 12 1 Cooperation with Jordanian
border authorities, which is currently lacking, would have to
increase. 2 2 Also, border crossings, specifically the Allenby
Bridge, would also have to increase their capacity and become
equipped with the infrastructure necessary to support more
trade. 23 The continuous presence of Israeli barriers to
movement and infrastructure within the West Bank make
implementing this measure unlikely, especially since it would
depend on Israeli goodwill.
D. INDEPENDENT TAx POLICY
While the Palestinian Authority has the ability to set
direct taxes in areas it controls, it needs the freedom to shape
its tax policy holistically. Specifically, the Palestinian
Authority needs to be able to set the VAT to a more reasonable
level in order to prevent dehydration of the Palestinian
economy.
While the ability to set the VAT rates would be helpful, the
Palestinian Authority needs to simplify the tax code. The
current direct tax code is a maze of regulations, with weak
121. See Economic Restrictions, supra note 57, at 6.
122. Id. at 7.
123. Id. at 6 - 7 (explaining the importance of the Allenby Bridge).
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implementation, and has become a drag on the economy. This
is something the Palestinian Authority can change now,
independent of a new agreement with Israel.
V. CONCLUSION
Right now, Palestinian economic rights are severely
curtailed. When the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights was passed, it was meant to ensure the right of
everyone to an "adequate standard of living,"124 a constantly
improving right. Instead, Palestinian standards of living have
been suffering since the signing of the Paris Protocol and
current Israeli policies continue to violate internationally
recognized economic rights.
While there are several changes that could be made to
improve the situation, until the Israeli military domination of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip ends, the Palestinian economy
will always be, to some extent, dependent on its larger
neighbor. The Palestinian Authority's new independent power
of tariff rates, collection of revenues, and freedom to negotiate
trade agreements with other nations became irrelevant the
moment Israel closed the borders. 25 Further, no level of fiscal
freedom will change the fact that Israel's control of land use in
much of the West Bank creates a de facto ceiling on
development alongside the artificial land shortage.
As painful as the current situation is, certain measures
will have to remain. The "common market" never actually
developed, however, the "free" movement of goods between
Israel and Palestine has benefitted Palestinians. So while cross
border movement faces an unending list of non-tariff barriers,
the alternative would be worse. Removing the "common
market" would not remove the barriers; it would just force
Palestinian businesses to pay a tariff on top of the delays they
already experience.
Before the signing of the Protocol in 1994, the Palestinian
economy grew at faster rates than Israel's. 26 The potential for
Palestinian economic success has been demonstrated by the
extremely successful diaspora (currently the most educated of

124.

Comment 4, supra note 22, at para. 1.

125. See Movement Restrictions, supra note 58, at 8.
126. E.g., Mel Levine, Palestinian Economic Progress Under the Oslo
Agreements, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1393, 1397 (1996).
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all Arab diasporas). 2 7 But so long as Palestinians, and the
goods they produce, are unable to travel freely, the economy
will remain an Israeli hostage and Palestinians' economic
rights will continue to be trampled upon.

127. Id. at 1398 ("[t]heir diaspora population of 3 to 3.5 million has been
among the most commercially successful everywhere it has gone .... ").

